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Abortion
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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Controversy arises in jurisprudence, says Professor Steven Lubet, “when judges
hear cases, not when they recuse themselves.” 1 Exceptions exist to every rule, of course.
Recently, there have been a number of prominent news reports detailing a relatively new
phenomenon whereby judges recuse themselves from hearing judicial bypass petitions by
minors seeking abortions without parental consent. 2 A judicial bypass provision is
necessary for minors who cannot or do not want to involve their parents in the abortion
decision, a provision the Supreme Court has held to be constitutionally required in any
parental consent statute regulating abortion for minors. 3
This phenomenon is something relatively strange and new to jurisprudence. As
Tennessee Circuit Court Judge Rita Stotts said recently, “I’ve been on the bench five
years and I’m not aware of a situation such as this where a judge has taken a position on
an entire class of cases.” 4 But as The New York Times reports, blanket recusal from
judicial bypass petitions is becoming more common, with over half the judges in the
Shelby Circuit of Tennessee refusing to hear bypass petitions entirely. 5 This is clearly a
very controversial matter, and has sparked a lot of recent discussion in newspaper op-eds
and the legal arena.
An op-ed in the Nashville-based Tennessean is unkind to the notion of recusal,
stating that a judge’s oath of office “doesn’t come with exemptions,” and that “those who
swear to uphold the laws of the nation and the state can’t pick and choose the statutes
they enforce.” 6 A counter-point op-ed appeared in the Memphis Commercial Appeal,
arguing that the ethics rules for judges “say that any Tennessee judge must step aside and
refuse to hear any case in which ‘the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” and stating that it was “hard to detect any burden on the system, or on the
pregnant young women who bring these matters to court.” 7

1

Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV.
657, 660 (1996).
2
See Adam Liptak, On Moral Grounds, Some Judges Are Opting Out of Abortion Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2005, at S1.
3
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
4
Bill Dries, Abortion Law Throws Fill-In Judges For Loop—Parental Consent is Not Always Required in
Tennessee, COM. APPEAL, June 19, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.commercialappeal.com (click on
“archives,” then do a search for the article title).
5
Liptak, supra note 2.
6
Editorial, Judges Must Enforce the Law, TENNESSEAN, Sept. 9, 2005, at 10. [hereinafter Enforce].
7
Lucian T. Pera, Recusals Should Be Judged As Admirable Acts, COM. APPEAL, Sept. 27, 2005, at B7,
available at http://www.commercialappeal.com (click on “archives”; then do a search for the article title).
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The Tennessee situation even prompted a group of legal and judicial ethics scholars
to write a letter to the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court, asking him to
“address the propriety of judges [recusing] themselves” from this matter. 8 The Court
refused this request, however, saying that the professors “could file a formal complaint
with the Tennessee Court of the Judiciary,” which is responsible for investigating judicial
ethics cases and has the power to sanction judges. 9
Clearly, this issue is important both for the specific effects it has on minors in the
issue of bypass procedures, and for the broader question of recusal generally. In this
article, I will lay out the history of abortion jurisprudence in the United States and
specifically the judicial bypass procedure. Next I will examine the issue of judicial
recusal, looking at both the history of recusal, and the judges’ interests when it comes to
this particular issue, to determine whether there is a legal foundation for a judge to recuse
herself from an entire class of cases with which she has a moral conflict. I will then
outline the interests of minors seeking abortions without parental consent, and detail the
myriad problems that already surround the issue of bypass proceedings generally. The
interests of minors, when confronted with a judge who refuses to hear their cases, are
both legal and medical in nature.
Next, I will look to balance the interests of judges and minors, respectively,
revealing a fundamental incompatibility between the two. I assert that the minor’s
interest in having access to the judicial system and obtaining a bypass proceeding trumps
any potential interest asserted by judges who may be morally conflicted by the procedure.
In light of this, I outline several potential solutions, and examine the theoretical and
practical potential of each in turn. I conclude that the most workable solution that
protects both the interests of the minor and the interests of the judge who wishes to recuse
herself from bypass hearings would be to require parental consent statutes to include a
provision for a constructive bypass to be provided to a minor seeking a hearing when
there is no judge on hand willing to hear the case, or when the case will not be heard in a
truly expedient manner.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAW AS IT APPLIES TO MINORS

¶7

The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that a woman has a right to decide whether
to carry her pregnancy to term. 10 Subsequently, the Supreme Court has held that there
may be no unwarranted intrusion into a woman’s right to make an abortion decision. 11
This means that, at least before viability, a State may not enact a statute or permit any
action that has the effect of preventing a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion either in
the form of a ban or an undue burden. 12 Things change slightly, however, when the
woman in question has not reached the legal age of maturity.
8

Letter from Paul D. Carrington, et al. to Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III (Aug. 12, 2005), available at
http://lib.law.washington.edu/tennesseejudges.pdf (the letter expresses the scholars’ concern over the
propriety and legality of judges using blanket recusal to avoid an entire category of cases, concluding that
the ethical and appropriate response would be for the judge to either set aside their moral qualms to decide
the case impartially or else resign from the bench).
9
Liptak, supra note 2.
10
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
11
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12
Id. at 846.
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The Supreme Court initially held in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth that a State could not lawfully impose a blanket provision that would allow an
absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy.13
Additionally, a State does not have the authority to provide any third party with an
arbitrary veto over the decision between the minor and her physician to terminate the
pregnancy. 14 Although this holding was subsequently upheld in Bellotti v. Baird, the
Court also clarified its position regarding the rights of minors, holding that “the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults.” 15 The Court
offered three particular rationales on which to base this distinction: (1) the “peculiar
vulnerability of children,” (2) children’s immaturity in making decisions, and (3) the
importance of parental involvement in raising their children. 16
The net result of this line of reasoning is that States could effect laws pursuant to
the minor-specific interests outlined in Bellotti, but could not place an undue burden on a
minor’s decision to obtain an abortion. Therefore, “if the State decides to require a
pregnant minor to obtain . . . consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative
procedure” to obtain the abortion, in order to prevent parents from having an arbitrary
veto over the decision. 17 The Court then proceeded to outline what would be required of
such a procedure. The procedure would have to be (1) anonymous, (2) sufficiently
expeditious to provide an effective opportunity to obtain an abortion, and (3) would
entitle a minor to demonstrate that she is mature enough to make her own abortion
decision, or (4) that even if she is not mature enough, an abortion is still in her best
interests. 18
III. WHAT LEADS TO RECUSAL?

¶10

Though the procedural requirements for parental consent statutes outlined in
Bellotti may seem fairly clear, enacting them has produced a number of problems. For
instance, there has been some question about the vagueness, and thus workability, of the
“maturity” standard. One scholar has stated that “when the question before the finder of
fact is one so inherently empty as determining in a few minutes the degree of a scared,
pregnant minor’s ‘maturity,’ in abortion proceedings there is the likelihood whatever
legal determination reached by the court is arbitrary — almost utterly without
meaning.” 19 However, issues of vagueness are not unique to judicial decisions over a
minor’s maturity to make an abortion decision. So why are judges refusing to hear such
cases?
¶11
It probably comes as little surprise that moral issues seem to be at the heart of the
recusal controversy. As John R. McCarroll of Shelby County Circuit Court wrote when
recusing himself from a bypass proceeding, “[t]aking the life of an innocent human being
is contrary to the moral order. . . . I could not in good conscience make a finding that
13

428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
Id.
15
443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 643.
18
Id.
19
Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 633
(2002).
14
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would allow the minor to proceed with the abortion.” 20 Though other judges in
Tennessee who have recused themselves declined to comment on their reasons for doing
so, 21 it is reasonable to assume that moral opposition to abortion provides the impetus for
refusing to hear such cases. 22
¶12
Thus, judges who chose not to hear these cases have cited a moral foundation to
justify recusing themselves from judicial bypass proceedings. But is there a legal
foundation to support this act, which amounts to a judge recusing herself from an entire
class of cases?
IV. BASIS FOR RECUSAL: THE JUDGE’S INTERESTS
¶13

Judicial impartiality and the right of a party to a trial before an impartial and
disinterested judge have been bedrock principles of our country since its inception. 23
However, the practical meaning of these principles has varied over time. Specifically, the
historical “duty to sit” doctrine has been supplanted more recently with the idea that a
judge should recuse herself even in cases where only the appearance of impartiality
reasonably exists. 24
¶14
Generally, this duty of recusal occurs under specific circumstances relating to the
specific case at hand (i.e., when a judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts, a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s attorney, or a direct
personal or fiduciary interest in the outcome of the litigation).25 When it comes to recusal
for bias, this bias must be a personal bias toward a particular party, and not a general or
judicial bias. 26 In fact, disqualification of a judge is permitted, but “not required because
the judge has definite views about the law pertaining to the case.” 27
¶15
Conspicuously lacking from these grounds for recusal is any express language
mandating recusal for bias toward a particular legal issue, or class of cases generally. In
fact, just the opposite is stated above regarding a judge’s views toward a particular law.
Contrary to this, however, the Eighth Circuit has stated that “[r]egardless of personal
discomfort with the law, it is the duty of judges to apply it. If they cannot do so with a
clear conscience, then they should remove themselves from this class of cases.” 28 This
would seem to suggest that recusal is in fact mandatory for a judge with a moral conflict
with a particular law that would prevent her from applying it objectively. In addition to
20

Liptak, supra note 2.
Id.
22
Editorial, Recusal As Judicial Defiance, 181 N.J.L.J. 1190 (2005). [hereinafter Defiance]; See also
Liptak, supra note 2.
23
Hon. D. Duff McKee, Disqualification of Trial Judge for Cause, in 50 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 449
at § 3 (1999) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) and stating that “[i]t is a matter of fundamental
due process that a party is entitled to a trial before an impartial and disinterested judicial officer”)
[hereinafter Disqualification].
24
Id. at 457-58. The historical view held that a trial judge was required to remain on a case unless it was
clearly improper to do so, in other words a “duty to sit,” evidenced by a review of older cases indicating a
great reluctance to force the recusal of a trial judge except for in extraordinary circumstances. The article
states that this doctrine has since been abandoned in favor of the modern standard, which emerged in the
early 1970s.
25
Id. at 461-78.
26
Id. at 473.
27
Id. (citing United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980)).
28
T.L.J. v. Webster, 792 F.2d 734, 739 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986).
21
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language like this, perhaps it is possible to draw out more grounds for recusal by further
examining the principles outlined above, namely those relating to personal bias and direct
personal interest in the outcome of the case.
The rationale for recusal expressly stated by at least one judge in the case of
judicial bypass proceedings is a personal moral objection to abortion and a refusal to
issue a holding that would lead to a minor obtaining one. 29 If a judge feels a strong moral
conviction that no minor would ever be mature enough to make the decision to obtain an
abortion, or is morally convinced that it is never in a minor’s best interest to obtain one,
this bias would go beyond the appearance of impartiality and into the realm of prejudging
cases. Indeed, if a reasonable person would have a suspicion or reasonable inference that
a judge would be influenced by a particular circumstance, this is sufficient to require
recusal. 30 Thus, a judge’s moral background could effectively prevent her from issuing
an impartial decision, or appearing to do so, and recusal would be appropriate.
A peculiar example of how this could play out is Catholic judges, who may suffer
an automatic conflict of interest when it comes to hearing abortion cases. 31 The story
goes like this: during the 2004 presidential campaign, Catholic bishops threatened to
exclude Senator John Kerry from the Eucharist because of his support for Roe v. Wade. 32
As judges must disqualify themselves simply for a financial interest in a particular case,
the argument for recusal is likely stronger when the interest in question is full
Communion and the promise of eternal life. 33 Therefore, it would seem as if judges who
subscribe to a belief system wherein being complicit in an abortion decision could
threaten their spiritual well-being, they should not hear that class of cases for an
unquestionable appearance of impartiality.
What is problematic about this approach is that if we decide that our judicial
system cannot sustain judges who recuse themselves from entire classes of cases, and if
the moral beliefs of members of a particular religion would require their recusal from an
entire class of cases, we would essentially be drawn into an unconstitutional religious test
for office. Fully exploring this problem would require a much more substantive analysis
beyond the scope of this article, so I will leave it at merely identifying the issue. Leaving
this aside, however, there is a flip side to this coin wherein recusal may not be required
due to a personal moral belief.
Mandatory disqualification of a judge “is not warranted when a judge’s impersonal
prejudice arises from the judge’s background experience.” 34 Therefore, a judge’s moral
background is not by itself a mandatory disqualifying factor when it comes to hearing any
particular type of case. Indeed, Tennessee Circuit Court Judge Rita Stotts says that she
herself has “some concerns” about abortion, but she feels “duty bound by virtue of my
having taken the oath of office” to rule impartially in these matters. 35 This tracks with the
29

Liptak, supra note 2.
Disqualification, supra note 23, at § 14.
31
Christopher D. Morris, Editorial, Stopping a Judicial Conflict of Interest, BOSTON GLOBE, August 9,
2005, at A21.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, (Mar. 10, 2003)
(explaining that merely because a judge has strong feelings about certain behavior, this does not require her
to recuse herself from a case, even if one of the parties in the case has engaged in such behavior, thus
suffering the “judge’s wrath.”).
35
Dries, supra note 4.
30
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notion that “although a judge has an obligation to recuse whenever there is good reason
to do so, the judge has an equal obligation not to recuse when there is no reason to do
so.” 36 In fact, there is reason to believe that, in the case of judicial bypass, recusal is
especially inappropriate unless a judge’s moral beliefs are so strong that it would be
utterly impossible for her to issue a fair ruling. 37
One recognized circumstance wherein a judge is exempted from the requirement of
recusal is when “no practical alternative remains for resolution of the litigation if the
judge withdraws.” 38 This is more commonly known as the “rule of necessity,” and
generally occurs when there is no other judge to step in and try the case. 39 There are
many instances where this is precisely the case when it comes to bypass petitions.
Briefly, the temporal nature of the abortion decision combined with the burdens of travel
in many rural areas can combine to create a circumstance where a minor would
effectively be denied access to a bypass procedure in time to obtain an abortion if the
local judge(s) decided to recuse themselves from hearing the petition.
In sum, it is unclear whether a judge should sit or recuse herself when it comes to
bypass cases. While the Eighth Circuit suggests recusal should be mandatory if a judge
feels she is biased, other principles mentioned above suggest that a judge should put aside
her personal morals to apply the law, especially if no alternative exists. Of course, if the
judge’s moral objections are indeed so strong as to preclude an unbiased ruling, then
putting aside these beliefs becomes an impossible proposition. In other words, if a judge
truly feels her personal moral principles will not allow her to provide the minor with a
fair and impartial hearing, we are led into a paradox by which the same action, i.e.,
recusal, can simultaneously be viewed as the right and wrong action for the judge to take.
The question then becomes which of these alternatives is worse for the minors, and which
is worse for our judicial system?
To state the issue in other terms, a judge is demonstrating a lack of respect for the
law, and to the oath she swore upon taking office, if she selectively enforces the law by
refusing to hear an entire class of cases. In other instances, “the law is relatively clear
that an employee’s private religious beliefs may not compromise a public duty owed by
that public servant” (e.g., firefighters and police officers may not recuse themselves from
having to protect those with whom they disagree for religious or any other reasons).40 It
is unclear why judges should be an exception to this principle when it comes to
performing their sworn duties.
Alternately, in recusing herself, the same judge is performing her legal duty by
avoiding a situation in which a party before the court might be subject to a trial conducted
by a biased decision maker. Thus, the same action is either a noble one, predicated on the

36

Disqualification, supra note 23, at 475 (citing Tonkovitch v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1084
(D. Kan. 1996)).
37
This standard is, of course, problematic because the strength of a moral belief is subjective, and thus
contingent on a judge’s self-reporting.
38
Disqualification, supra note 23, at 479.
39
Id.
40
Darryll M. Halcolmb & James R. Jones, Culture Shock in the Workplace: The Legal Treatment of
Cultural Behavior Under Title VII, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 139, 154 (2004), (citing Rodriguez v. City of
Chi., 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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bedrock notions of fairness and impartiality, or the ultimate example of the “judicial
activism” decried by so many pundits of late. 41
¶24
Either way you look at it, this presents a conundrum for legal ethics. Some legal
scholars have argued that government employees, specifically attorneys (and perhaps
judges as well), should have their right of conscience protected by statute. 42 The
argument analogizes the already-accepted “conscience clauses” whereby physicians may
suffer no penalty for refusing to perform abortions. 43 According to this doctrine, a
professional “should be entitled to have his or her personal scruples respected to the
extent that is reasonably practical.” 44 As the right-of-conscience advocates put it, there
must be a “compelling reason” to put a person in the situation of having to decide
whether to “leav[e] his job or violat[e] his conscience.” 45
¶25
In the case of abortion, however, there is a practical effect on minors that certainly
seems to rise to the level of a “compelling reason” that would outweigh any personal
moral conflicts on the part of the judges. Recusal by judges in many instances may
effectively deny a pregnant minor access to the courts, effectively denying her the
opportunity to exercise her constitutional rights. Thus, the interests of judges in recusing
themselves must be weighed against the interest of the minors who seek bypass petitions.
V. BLANKET RECUSAL GENERALLY
¶26

Before getting to the specific issue of recusal from bypass petitions, it is worth
briefly examining whether the general practice of recusal from an entire class of cases is
something we want to condone. If it is permissible or acceptable generally, then we will
have to look specifically at the issue of bypass hearings to determine how and why it is
problematic in this area. As was discussed in the prior section on recusal, it is unclear,
based on the legal principles of judicial recusal and the duty of office, whether a judge
may recuse herself from an entire class of cases if she feels there will be a conflict in each
and every case. Therefore, a theoretical discussion is warranted.
¶27
A good place to start is asking whether we would think it acceptable to extend this
principle of allowing judges to recuse themselves from all bypass petitions to other
classes of cases. For instance, would we allow a sitting judge with a deep moral
objection to the death penalty to recuse herself from all criminal cases in which the death
penalty might be applied by law? What about a judge with deeply held racist beliefs who
refused to hear all affirmative action cases? 46 Clearly this could throw a wrench into the
cogs of our justice system depending on the number of judges who decide they have
moral conflicts with particular laws and thus types of cases. Though some might say that
sliding down this slippery slope is unlikely at best, allowing judges to recuse themselves
41

“Judicial activism” is generally defined as “legislating from the bench,” in other words, those cases
where the judge does not apply the law in a strict fashion because she disagrees with what the substantive
outcome would be.
42
Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, A Proposed Right of Conscience for Government Attorneys, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 311 (2003).
43
Id. at 325.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 327.
46
While racist beliefs are clearly not considered “moral” in our society at this time, they were once widely
accepted, and are thus presented for purposes of analogy to the contentious moral issue of abortion.
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when there is not a specific conflict of interest particular to that party or case would set a
precedent that would have the potential to render the legal system impotent. 47
¶28
On the other hand, we might ask if we can “conjure a case involving law
constitutionally secure and lawfully in force which, for reasons of personal morality, a
judge could or should, without consequence, refuse to adjudicate.” 48 Some would say
yes, arguing that judges should not be forced to resign if they feel they must recuse
themselves for reasons of personal morality, because “the legal system can sustain their
acts of conscience.” 49 Perhaps such instances will be infrequent, and obviously the
extent to which allowing this practice would hamper our legal system depends on how
common the practice becomes, as well as the number of cases brought under these bypass
statutes. It seems as if most judges would set aside their personal moral qualms to uphold
the oath they swore upon taking office, as this has not cropped up as a legal issue before.
¶29
I would assert that allowing judges to recuse themselves from a particular class of
cases based on moral objections is something we should avoid in our legal system, and it
is something we should particularly avoid when it comes to recusal based on the specific
interests of minors in having access to such proceedings.
VI. THE MINOR’S INTEREST
¶30

Even if we had no issues with judges recusing themselves from particular classes of
cases generally, there are specific reasons why allowing blanket recusal in bypass
procedures for minors seeking abortions is an especially unappealing proposition. The
main distinction between abortion and other types of cases is the necessity for expedience
in obtaining a fair and unbiased ruling. As the Supreme Court stated in the second
Bellotti case, “the abortion decision is one that simply cannot be postponed, or it will be
made by default with far-reaching consequences.” 50
¶31
The myriad delays associated with obtaining an abortion create a problem of
timeliness that a judicial recusal would only serve to exacerbate. The bypass procedure is
already a path that is “long and lonely” for a minor seeking judicial consent to an
abortion, 51 without having to deal with a judge refusing to hear her case. After
discovering she is pregnant, a minor must take a number of time-consuming steps,
including “contact[ing] the attorney, arrang[ing] for transportation to court, and leav[ing]
school without having her parents learn of the situation.” 52 In fact, the minor may suffer
an unwitting delay from not detecting her pregnancy in its early stages. Young women
“often have irregular menstrual cycles, causing them to take longer to recognize that they
are pregnant.” 53
47

As of this writing, I have not discovered any jurisprudence on this particular issue regarding whether it is
legally permissible.
48
Defiance, supra note 22.
49
Id.
50
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (the consequences include the effect on the mother’s life
when burdened with a child she does not want, the medical risks associated with carrying a pregnancy to
term or having an abortion later in the pregnancy, etc.).
51
J. Shoshanna Ehrlich & Jamie Ann Sabino, A Minor’s Right to Abortion—The Unconstitutionality of
Parental Participation in Bypass Hearings, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1185, 1202 (1991).
52
Id.
53
Jennifer Blasdell, Mother, May I?: Ramifications for Parental Involvement Laws for Minors Seeking
Abortion Services, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 287 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v.

132

Vol. 2:1]
¶32

¶33

¶34

¶35

¶36

Paul Danielson

All of these steps have the potential to significantly delay a minor seeking judicial
consent. Prior to all of these delays, a minor must learn about the law that allows her to
seek a bypass in the first place. Based on an Alabama case study, minors must
sometimes make this discovery when even the courts themselves are not aware of or
prepared for bypass petitions. 54 And if a minor is in an area where judges have recused
themselves from hearing such petitions, she takes these steps only to be denied access to
justice when she reaches the courtroom door.
Recusal can result in extended delays when another judge cannot be found to hear
the case in an expedient manner, especially in summer months when many judges are on
vacation. 55 These types of delays occur even though the holding in Bellotti requires
bypass petition proceedings to be conducted with “sufficient expedition to provide an
effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.” 56 This “effective opportunity” to
obtain an abortion is necessary due to the myriad consequences for the minor that could
result from being denied the choice to obtain an abortion.
The consequences to a minor who cannot obtain an abortion are not only numerous,
but potentially severe. The Court recognized that it may be particularly burdensome to a
minor due to her “probable education, employment skills, financial resources and
emotional maturity.” 57 Pregnant minors may also “face special, often age-specific
problems of financial insecurity, uncertain familial reaction, societal stigma, and
immaturity.” 58 It is clear that minors have a very strong interest in having an opportunity
to obtain an abortion should they decide not to carry a pregnancy to term for the
aforementioned reasons.
Abortion is a time-sensitive matter for other reasons as well, namely the physical
risks that accompany pregnancy and delaying an abortion procedure. 59 When it comes to
abortion, “a woman’s health risks are lowest if she seeks care during the early weeks of
her pregnancy.” 60 Additionally, though the medical risks associated with abortion are not
as high as that of childbirth, 61 such risks increase with every week of pregnancy beyond
eight weeks.
Therefore, it is clear that delaying the abortion procedure can have medical risks for
the minor in question. As evidenced above, the bypass procedure is one fraught with
delays. Indeed, the American Medical Association, the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Academy of Pediatricians have all
repeatedly testified that minors suffer medically-problematic delays as a result of the

Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 633 (N.J. 2000)).
54
See Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, “Honey, I Have No Idea”: Court Readiness to Handle
Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IOWA L. REV. 75 (2002) (detailing a case study of
Alabama courts, finding a lack of awareness about bypass procedures on behalf of court officials when
researchers called to request information).
55
Ehrlich & Sabino, supra note 51, at 1203.
56
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979).
57
Id.
58
Matthew B. Hayhurst, Parental Notification of Abortion and Minors’ Rights Under the Montana
Constitution, 58 MONT. L. REV. 565, 572 (1997).
59
Silverstein & Speitel, supra note 54, at 111 (citing Williard Cates Jr., et al., The Risks Associated with
Teenage Abortion, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621, 623 (1983)).
60
Blasdell, supra note 53, at 288.
61
Id.
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bypass system. 62 These statements were made before the issue of delay due to judicial
recusal came into the public spotlight. 63
¶37
Additionally, a minor’s decision to obtain an abortion may still be thwarted for
other reasons, even if she manages to obtain judicial consent in a timely manner. There
are many areas of the country in which abortion providers are scarce, including eighty-six
counties in the United States that have no abortion provider (thirty-two percent of women
of reproductive age live in those counties). 64 Clearly, these practical barriers to abortion
are substantial without the minor having to seek an alternative judicial avenue when her
local judge refuses to hear her bypass petition.
¶38
The delays associated with gaining access to a facility where an abortion may be
obtained in many instances mirror the delays associated with obtaining judicial consent
outlined above. Therefore, in many instances, having to obtain judicial consent before
finding an abortion provider may serve as a double-delay that could severely increase the
health risks to the minor seeking an abortion. In fact, it is easy to imagine scenarios in
which this combination of delays could result in a minor effectively being denied the
choice completely. Adding recusal on top of all these other delays increases the
likelihood that a minor would be denied this choice.
¶39
It is clear that a minor’s interest in having access to the court system to obtain an
expedient and confidential hearing is extremely strong. However, we must weigh the
interests of the judges above with the interests of the minors just stated.
VII.

BALANCING INTERESTS

¶40

It is clear that judges who believe being complicit in an abortion decision is
contrary to their moral beliefs have an interest in recusing themselves from hearing
bypass petitions. As judges, they also have an obligation to uphold the part of their oath
requiring them to hear each case in an impartial manner, or to recuse themselves if this is
impossible. While these two things may or may not be incompatible, they are certainly
incompatible with the idea that judges may not choose which laws to selectively enforce.
¶41
A judge’s obligation to uphold the judicial oath seems to result in the paradox that,
when it comes to a class of cases in which a judge has a direct moral conflict that could
result in partiality, she has both a duty to recuse herself and a duty to avoid selectively
enforcing laws. In other words, a judge who has a severe moral conflict with a particular
law in a case that must be decided in an expedient manner (and thus may not be
reassigned to another judge or jurisdiction depending on the circumstances), would be
required both to hear and not hear the case. In the case of bypass petitions, therefore, a
balancing of interests reveals that even when you take a minor’s interest out of the
question, there is a need to find a solution to the problems arising from recusal.
¶42
Minors have their own set of interests, the most important of which is access to the
court system. If a minor cannot find a judge to hear her case in a sufficiently expedient
manner, the decision will be made by default and her rights will have been denied. Given
62
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the risks and burdens to minors associated with carrying a pregnancy to term, delaying an
abortion procedure, or being forced into a back-alley abortion, it is clear that the minor’s
interests in obtaining an expedient hearing are paramount. Forcing a judge to eschew her
moral beliefs and hear a minor’s case is not in the interest of the minor or the judge,
however. As will be outlined below, subjecting a minor to a judge who is biased against
abortion may have the same unacceptable negative effects as denying her a hearing in the
first instance.
¶43
What we have, therefore, is a situation wherein both parties’ interests cannot be
adequately satisfied by the current paradigm. It is imperative, therefore, that we discover
a solution to this problem. In the next few sections, I will explore a variety of solutions,
and examine their potential merits.
VIII.

RESIGNATION, SANCTIONS, AND/OR IMPEACHMENT

¶44

As outlined above, it is important for judges to be as independent and autonomous
as possible within the context of our judicial system. However, the purpose of judicial
independence is not to benefit judges, but rather to “protect the public’s interest in having
a judiciary capable of deciding matters without fear of consequences.” 65 And a fear of
consequences is certainly well-founded when it comes to the issue of elected judges
deciding abortion cases. 66 For instance, Judge D’Army Bailey, a judge on the circuit
court in Memphis where a number of judges have recused themselves, expressed concern
that his decision to hear bypass cases could have political consequences in the next
judicial election. 67 “I can’t keep a job constantly fearing that I’m going to lose it,” said
Bailey, a quote that tracks directly with the purpose of judicial independence noted
above. 68
¶45
The most obvious, though certainly not the least problematic, solution to this
problem would be for judges who feel that they cannot apply a particular law for moral
reasons to resign from the bench. A recusal from an entire class of cases amounts to
selectively enforcing the law, which runs contrary to the principles of our judicial system.
Judges have been removed or disciplined for bad faith, defined as using the judicial office
to “accomplish a purpose . . . beyond the legitimate exercise of judicial authority.” 69 As
an op-ed in the Tennessean put it, “if . . . judges are so strongly opposed to this or any
other law, perhaps they should consider running for a legislative post.” 70
¶46
Impeachment is problematic in that it is an “all-or-nothing” solution for “judicial
misconduct.” 71 Though the impeachment option exists in nearly every state, it is limited
in some states to “conduct connoting illegality,” and thus does not reach other conduct
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that might demonstrate a particular judge is unfit for judicial office. 72 In other words,
judges are usually removed “only for the most egregious conduct.” 73
Denying a pregnant minor access to the judicial system by refusing to hear her
bypass petition may rise to the level of egregious conduct, as a bypass petition may be the
only way the minor can legally, and perhaps safely, obtain an abortion. 74 As was
established at the outset of this article, however, a judge’s decision to recuse herself from
all bypass cases may be framed in a way such that a judge is, paradoxically, performing
her duty by avoiding an unfair trial.
Sanctions are another possibility that would fall short of the extreme measure of
impeachment. The impetus to sanction or remove recalcitrant judges from office would
generally fall on Judicial Conduct Organizations (JCOs), which exist in all fifty states,
and are charged with “investigating, filing, and prosecuting complaints about judicial
misconduct and . . . recommending sanctions . . . or imposing such sanctions
themselves.” 75 A common ground for sanctions or removal, one recognized in the
ABA’s Code of Judicial Conduct, is “willful and persistent failure to perform judicial
duties.” 76 This categorization certainly seems to fit the issue of blanket recusal from
bypass hearings, though once again it depends on how “duty” is classified. 77
What is problematic with sanctions or impeachment is that it may take pregnant
minors seeking an abortion out of the frying pan and into the proverbial fire. Were
judges with profound moral objections to abortion compelled to hear bypass cases by the
threat of sanctions or impeachment, a minor, instead of having no access to the court
system may gain access only to face a hostile and prejudiced judge. There are numerous
examples of why this is not a good idea.
After a set of cases in Indiana where minors were denied judicial consent, word
spread around the state that judges would not grant petitions and the state supreme court
would always defer to these judges. 78 As a consequence of this, bypasses were only
requested by four minors in Indiana’s most populous county and by one minor in its
second most populous county over a period of six years. 79 In other words, due to judicial
prejudice against abortion, it appears as if teens were effectively denied fair hearings and
thus the exercise of their constitutional right to a bypass petition to obtain an abortion.
Thus, impeachment and/or sanctions against judges who choose to recuse
themselves from bypass petition cases are not good solutions to the problems outlined
above. Though the mechanisms are in place, they are not especially expedient, and are
unlikely to be utilized, especially given the controversy surrounding abortion.
Additionally, the threat of sanctions or impeachment might drive judges who otherwise
might recuse themselves due to a feeling that they cannot be impartial to hear cases
72
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anyway. This is not fair to either the judge or the minor, as it either requires a judge to
issue a ruling that compromises her moral principles or punishes a minor with an adverse
ruling from a prejudiced judge. Clearly, another solution to the conflict must be found.
IX. THE THEORETICAL CASE TO ABOLISH BYPASS PROVISIONS
¶52

¶53

¶54

¶55

¶56

One wonders how the bypass procedure ever came into existence. For when could
it possibly be in the best interests of a minor who is ruled incapable of making her own
medical decisions to be forced to carry a child to term? J. Shoshanna Ehrlich has noted
the apparent lack of explanation for the result reached by the Supreme Court in Bellotti,
whereby a teen who is too immature to decide whether or not to obtain an abortion is
forced to assume the responsibilities of motherhood which “entail a never-ending array of
decisions with life-shaping consequences for both herself and her child.” 80
To put it another way, a teen wishing to carry her pregnancy to term has full
autonomy to make pregnancy-related health care decisions, yet, for some reason
unarticulated by the Court, a teen wishing to abort lacks this maturity.81 Indeed, as
Ehrlich points out, the Court may have failed to explicate this further, “because there is
no explanation that would bear constitutional scrutiny.” 82 Perhaps the Court will be
willing to throw itself heroically into this logical breach in a future decision, but the
current controlling case law seems highly problematic.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court is unlikely to reconsider these issues,
though I join the call to assert that they should, based on a wealth of research
demonstrating that one of the premises the Supreme Court relied on in ruling that bypass
procedures are constitutional is flawed. In Bellotti, the Court found that autonomy to
make the abortion decision differed from that of adults for three reasons, one of which is
the limited decision-making capacity of minors by virtue of their age and immaturity. 83
However, the Court merely presumed this was true, stating categorically that minors
lacked the “experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them.” 84
Studies have shown that the decision-making capacity of minors, and the reasoning
process they employ, for making psychological and medical decisions is equivalent to
that of adults. 85 These findings demand judicial scrutiny and perhaps a shift in
jurisprudence as to the maturity of minors to make these decisions. One has to wonder
how the Supreme Court decision in Bellotti would have turned had the justices denied
this premise in reaching their conclusion. It is an issue the Court should revisit, in any
case.
Further supporting this notion of adolescent autonomy are recent trends in
legislative treatment of juvenile criminals, in which minors are increasingly subjected to
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adult decision-making standards and their according punishments. 86 Indeed, the disparity
between the treatment of a minor’s autonomy when it comes to reproductive decisions
and criminal offenses amounts to no less than “legislative dissonance.” 87 In this
patchwork of jurisprudence, a more solid foundation based on empirical research would
be helpful for resolving these seemingly disparate maturity standards.
¶57
Minors are also accorded a great deal of autonomy to make almost all other medical
decisions. Indeed, in the area of medical decision-making, minors possess significant
self-consent rights when it comes to pregnancy and other personally sensitive issues. 88 If
minors are permitted to self-consent to medical services for pregnancy, venereal disease
and drug abuse, there seems to be little justification for regulating their autonomy when it
comes to the abortion decision out of a concern for their welfare. 89
¶58
Perhaps the case can be made that an abortion procedure is substantively different
than these other instances, and some sort of line must be drawn to distinguish benign
treatment from invasive and potentially dangerous procedures in order to determine a
minor’s capacity for consent. But as of now, there seems to be no principled reason why
minors are held mature enough to make all pregnancy-related decisions without parental
consent besides having an abortion. Thus, were the Supreme Court to revisit this issue
based on this new scientific evidence, perhaps they would hold bypass provisions to be
unnecessary in light of this new conception of a minor’s maturity. This, in turn, would
render the issue of judicial recusal from bypass hearings obsolete.
X. THE PRACTICAL CASE TO ABOLISH BYPASS PETITIONS
¶59

Whether judicial bypass procedures are a theoretically-sound proposition, their
enactment in practice leaves much to be desired. 90 Generally, the implementation of
judicial bypass statutes “has been highly inconsistent, leaving vulnerable minors without
a meaningful bypass operation.” 91 Thus, legislators should move to abolish such
provisions in light of these issues. Examples of problematic implementation are
ubiquitous when one looks at the practical realities of the bypass procedure.
¶60
In Texas, for example, an organization dedicated to ensuring minors’ access to
bypass proceedings found that fewer than half of the Texas county clerks surveyed were
prepared to handle the bypass petition, or even to dispense correct information when a
minor inquired into the option. 92 Additionally, judges in some counties were found to be
either unaware of the law, or refused to follow procedure out of hostility to abortion. 93
¶61
Another recent study focused on the Alabama juvenile court system in regard to the
bypass procedure. 94 As was the case in Texas, the research demonstrated that many of
86
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the juvenile courts remained poorly prepared to handle waiver inquiries due to a lack of
knowledge of the law to provide minors with information upon request, despite the law
having been on the books for well over a decade. 95 Additionally, some judges in
Alabama also refused to comply with the law requiring a bypass hearing out of personal
bias or hostility to the abortion procedure. 96
In fact, most courts in Alabama did not even inform minors of their right to courtappointed counsel, one of the basic and most important provisions of the bypass statute. 97
Even among some of the courts that were knowledgeable and prepared, minors were
refused their right to a bypass proceeding due to judicial recusal, thus requiring them to
travel to another county. 98 These shortcomings are unacceptable when the issue in
question is a minor attempting to exercise a constitutional right.
Other practical problems include judges adding to the burden of the bypass
procedure by imposing non-required and potentially unconstitutional conditions on a
minor’s petition. For instance, some judges in Alabama have conditioned the grant of a
waiver on the requirement that minors seeking abortion are counseled from a pro-life
religious organization. 99 Though this practice likely violates the Establishment Clause,
attorneys who recognize the reality of obtaining a waiver for their client from judges in
the “Bible Belt” are hesitant to challenge this “boulder in the pathway of abortion,”
saying that “no one is in a position to stop [the judges].” 100
Additionally, in Alabama (a problematic state, apparently), judges have begun
appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the fetus in judicial bypass hearings, a
practice that is “likely to gain momentum.” 101 Some have even suggested that appointing
guardians to represent the fetus is the “wave of the future” in abortion regulation. 102 If
this is the case, it is worrisome for those who want minors to have a fair and equitable
court hearing that reduces as much as possible the trauma of a minor appearing before a
judge to reveal personal details of her life.
Though this practice of appointing fetal guardians will likely increase the burden
on a minor seeking an abortion by turning the hearing into an adversarial procedure, it is
likely constitutional and consistent with federal precedent. 103 Indeed, as long as the State
articulates its interest in protecting potential life, guardianship appointments will be
consistent with the Casey framework. 104 It is relevant to point out all these issues,
however, because it is possible that even if the Supreme Court would uphold them
individually, they may combine to create an undue burden in particular cases.
There are also practical issues at the other extreme, when the bypass procedure
seems unnecessary or superfluous in areas where judges find that most minors are mature
95
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in making their decision. This seems to be the case in Massachusetts, where the bypass
procedure is ineffective as to its intended purpose. One judge in Massachusetts, who is
morally opposed to abortion, has asserted that the bypass law in his state is “utterly
preposterous. The court is a pure rubber stamp. All the law does is to harass kids.” 105
Therefore, the bypass procedure seems like nothing more than an unnecessary delay in a
minor obtaining an abortion which, as mentioned above, merely increases the risks to her
health. 106
¶67
That judicial consent is almost always granted in Massachusetts strongly indicates
that minors are making mature or informed decisions about their pregnancies. 107 This
also tracks with the theoretical argument for abolishing the bypass statutes outlined
above, namely that the statutes are an unnecessary burden on minors who should be
presumed mature enough to make the medical decision to obtain an abortion. Thus, there
is both a theoretical and practical case to be made for abolishing parental consent statutes
entirely.
¶68
Though abolishing bypass statutes through legislation seems to make a lot of sense,
it is unlikely that such a thing will actually occur due to certain realities of our political
system. Such statutes offer a wealth of political capital to politicians “who can suddenly
be pro-life, pro-choice, and pro-family all at once.” 108 And though there may be
psychological research supporting the notion that minors are mature enough to make this
decision without the consent of their parents, it is generally clear that the conventional
wisdom in our society is the opposite.
XI. MOUNTING A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO RECUSAL
¶69

If parental consent statutes cannot be abolished politically, perhaps they can be
challenged constitutionally in light of the increasing practice of judicial recusal. A party
could make an as-applied challenge to bypass statutes in those cases where judicial
recusal from bypass hearings would create enough of a barrier to a minor’s right to obtain
an abortion to render the statute unconstitutional. However, there are a number of
problems with mounting such a challenge.
¶70
The first problem is finding a plaintiff to try the case. The Supreme Court held in
Belotti that every parental consent statute must contain a bypass provision that, among
other things, provides for an anonymous proceeding. 109 Bypass provisions in parental
consent statutes were originally included not only for the purpose of preventing an
arbitrary third-party veto over a minor’s constitutional right to seek an abortion, but also
to protect the minor in those cases where informing one or both parents of the pregnancy
or subsequent abortion would have untoward consequences. 110
105
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¶71

The type of minor most likely to be injured by judicial recusal is probably the type
of minor who is least likely to volunteer as a plaintiff for the purposes of challenging a
bypass statute. Studies have shown that the large majority of pregnant minors choose to
involve their parents in the decision to obtain an abortion or carry a pregnancy to term. 111
The bypass procedure is only a preferred and necessary option for those minors who feel
they cannot involve their parents, whether out of fear of harming family relations, being
prevented from obtaining an abortion by a controlling parent, or even physical abuse.
However, the relatively small number of minors who may be affected by the recusal issue
does not make it any less important or consequential for them.
¶72
For pregnant minors who do not want to involve their parents in the abortion
decision, it is already hard (and potentially dangerous) to remain anonymous in the face
of the attendant difficulties associated with obtaining a judicial bypass. To start, a young
woman “must find a way to place the initial call to the courthouse to begin the waiver
process.” 112 Indeed, the difficulty of making even a single phone call to start the waiver
process is “exponentially increased when a minor attempts to be absent from home,
school, or work.” 113 For all these reasons, mounting a challenge to parental consent
statutes in the face of judicial recusal is problematic for the practical reason that a
plaintiff may not step forward to try the case.
¶73
There are other reasons why mounting a successful challenge to any abortion law is
a difficult proposition. Comparing abortion decisions to other types of constitutional
analyses, Gillian E. Metzger asserts that the abortion undue burden standard is “virtually
unique in its lack of protection against unnecessary and unjustified burdens on a
constitutionally protected right.” 114 Indeed, the Supreme Court upheld almost all of the
regulations on abortion challenged by the plaintiffs in its Casey decision. 115 This
suggests that the Court “will in fact set a high threshold and perhaps only find a
substantial obstacle when a regulation serves as the equivalent of outlawing abortion for
those women it affects.” 116 It is possible, however, that the further delays associated with
recusal may be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back when it comes to
meeting this threshold.
¶74
Another problem with mounting these case-specific challenges against parental
consent statutes with bypass provisions from which judges recuse themselves is the
inconsistency with which courts rule on constitutional challenges in abortion cases. For
instance, a court in North Dakota allowed a facial challenge to a twenty-four hour waiting
period requirement (though ultimately upheld the requirement), 117 while a court in Utah
dismissed a similar challenge as frivolous. 118 In Ohio v. Akron, the Court rejected a
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facial challenge to the bypass procedure “which conceivably could have allowed a delay
of twenty-two days, including an appeal.” 119
¶75
There are examples of potential challenges, however. Helena Silverstein and
Leanne Speitel make the case that Alabama’s bypass statute, as applied, represents a
“substantial obstacle” to a minor’s established constitutional right to an abortion due to
time delays involved in its implementation. 120 Even if the case for an as-applied
challenge could be made, however, courts seem to be hesitant to move beyond examining
the facial component of parental consent laws to look at their application in fact, as noted
above. Even in Hodgson v. Minnesota, where implementation testimony was introduced,
“there was not much focus on time delay.”121
¶76
Therefore, mounting a constitutional challenge to recusal by way of an as-applied
argument to parental consent statutes is a solution that leaves much to be desired in the
practical sense. Finding a plaintiff in each instance would be a difficult initial step, and
upon examining abortion jurisprudence, it is not clear that such a challenge would even
be successful. Looking at other potential solutions that do not involve abandoning or
overturning judicial bypass statutes generally is therefore imperative.
XII.

CONSTRUCTIVE BYPASS

¶77

Another alternative would be to require parental consent statutes to contain
provisions that would provide constructive judicial consent to any minor in a district
where enough judge(s) refuse to hear judicial bypass cases so as to make an expedient
and confidential hearing unlikely. Many physicians may be wary of performing an
abortion without express written documentation, so for this proposal to be most effective,
a notary or court employee should provide a form certifying the judge has refused to hear
the bypass petition, and thus consent has been granted. This would be analogous to the
issuance of a default judgment in a civil suit, where one party fails to appear in court. In
fact, some states already have provisions in their parental consent statutes wherein a
minor is granted constructive bypass if the hearing does not occur within a set period of
time. 122 Such provisions should be a requirement of any bypass statute in light of this
growing phenomenon of judicial recusal, as it would serve to ensure a minor’s right to
make the abortion decision in a timely manner.
¶78
The irony here, of course, is that a judge who refuses to hear such cases because
they do not wish to be complicit in a minor’s abortion through their action in hearing a
case would become complicit in a minor’s abortion through not hearing the case. It is
really a question of how many steps removed from the actual decision a judge wishes to
be in order to satisfy her moral conscience. However, as judges who recuse themselves
must already be aware, minors in cases where another judge is readily available will
119
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likely, though not always, obtain a judicial bypass. Therefore, this solution seems
relatively equitable for all parties involved. Additionally, in balancing the recusing
judge’s moral interest in not making a decision that would lead to an abortion versus the
minor’s interest in gaining access to the court to exercise her rights, the minor’s interest
seems to intuitively hold greater weight.
¶79
Whether such a provision should be required of parental consent statutes has
obviously not been considered by the Supreme Court. As of this writing, a formal
complaint has not even been filed in the Tennessee Supreme Court that would require the
issue to be addressed by its justices. 123 However, such a solution certainly seems
equitable, as it would ameliorate the risk that a minor’s access to the court system, and
thus a bypass hearing, would be denied by virtue of judicial recusal.
¶80
The only risk here is that this solution puts judges with a moral objection to
abortion in the same position they would be in by holding a hearing (i.e., making a
decision that directly results in an outcome contrary to their moral principles). It is
conceivable in this instance that judges whose moral principles would cause them to
believe that opposing abortion is more important than upholding their judicial oath to
decide cases in an impartial manner might start hearing cases instead of recusing
themselves. 124 This may be the case especially in those instances where electoral pressure
from conservative constituents would lead a judge to do everything in her power to
minimize the instances of abortion. The cases in Indiana and Alabama speak to the
problems for minors when biased judges hear bypass petitions.
XIII.

INNOVATION

¶81

One potential solution, at least to the problem of minors being denied access to a
hearing, 125 could be the employment of modern technology. As discussed earlier, one of
the main reasons the particular issue of recusal from bypass proceedings is so
problematic is the time factor. The abortion decision is not one that can wait for a
transfer of venue, and especially with the need to remain anonymous, travel that requires
time, money, and excessive distance, can burden the minor to the extent that a judicial
bypass becomes practically impossible to obtain.
¶82
If a judge in a particular area refuses to hear a bypass petition, one potential
solution would be to re-assign that judge to a different jurisdiction and replace her with a
judge willing to hear such petitions. 126 This can be practically problematic, however,
especially if the practice of recusal becomes widespread. There are also jurisdictions
such as Montana where the distance between courtrooms is such that reassignment would
likely entail forcing a judge to move her place of residence, something that would
123
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probably be met with some resistance. Therefore, bringing different judges into
jurisdictions where the sitting judge refuses to hear bypass petitions is problematic. On
the flip side, as we see above, it can be an incredible burden on a minor to travel to a
different jurisdiction in order to obtain a hearing from a willing judge.
This gap can be bridged by utilizing technology to allow a willing judge to hear the
minor’s petition with a minimum travel burden for both parties. Videotape testimony has
become widely accepted in court cases where the witness, for whatever reason, cannot be
present in the courtroom to give testimony in person. 127 Currently, videoconferencing
technology that allows for streaming video of VHS-or-better quality is readily available
at a reasonable price. 128 It would be very simple to set up a room in a courthouse where a
willing judge could hold a remote hearing by video to listen to a minor’s testimony and
make the appropriate judgment under the requirements of the bypass provision.
A remote video hearing would solve a number of problems associated with the
practical implementation of bypass hearings, as well as the issue of judicial recusal. A
minor would only have to travel to the most proximate courthouse to obtain a hearing,
thereby reducing the burden of time and travel as much as possible. A judge with a
severe moral conflict could recuse herself with the assurance that she is not
unconstitutionally denying court access to a minor. And finally, scheduling conflicts that
might delay a bypass hearing, and thus increase the health risks to the minor, would be
more easily solved, as any judge with jurisdiction who is willing to hear bypass cases
could be available during any gaps in her schedule.
There is a clear downside to this potential solution, namely that a hearing in-person
is the most preferable method for a judge to make the fact-finding necessary to issue a
ruling on a bypass petition. Simply put, visual clues such as body language will be less
readily apparent when scrutinized over a video connection than when viewed in person.
However, at the pace with which technology is improving, and the high quality
videoconferencing technology already available, this concern is most certainly
outweighed by the necessity of providing minors access to the court system for an
expedient, fair, and anonymous procedure. Of course, this solution would pose no
guarantee that the hearing would be fair, and would not address the jurisprudential
problems, but it would remedy the problem of a minor being denied a hearing altogether
and is thus a step in the right direction.
The use of remote video hearings is certainly a solution worth exploring, especially
in light of the fact that, despite the arguments set forth in the above sections, the Supreme
Court has generally held bypass provisions to be constitutionally acceptable.
Additionally, the oral arguments of a recent Supreme Court case, 129 heard after the above
127

Article, Foundation for Contemporaneous Videotape Evidence, 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 493
(2005). The article states that there is a growing trend in the legal system of accepting and utilizing
videotape technology in a variety of areas, including videotaped trials, videotaped depositions and
videotaped or closed-circuit testimony of allegedly abused children.
128
For instance, Apple Computer, Inc.’s iSight technology allows real-time, 640 x 480 (VGA) resolution
videoconferencing with a broadband internet connection. See http://www.apple.com/isight/ for further
details.
129
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S.Ct. 961 (2006). While the holding did not address
this idea, as the case was about an emergency provision for the minor’s health in which a doctor would not
have to obtain anybody’s consent, questions by Justices Scalia and Kennedy during oral arguments
(Transcript of Oral Argument, Ayotte, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-1144.pdf) suggested that a phone
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section was written, suggest that teleconferencing may be a viable option for, at the very
least, providing a minor with an opportunity for a bypass hearing.
XIV. CONCLUSION
¶87

The new and spreading practice of judges recusing themselves from judicial bypass
proceedings is exceedingly problematic, both for our judicial system in general, and for
pregnant minors who require expedient and effective access to the court system. It
remains to be seen how courts will address this issue, but hopefully this article has
managed to outline the basic issues associated with recusal from an entire class of cases,
and the issues associated with recusal from bypass proceedings specifically. Moreover,
perhaps the analysis of potential solutions will help determine the best course of action in
addressing this important issue. Given the effects on minors of delaying the abortion
decision or forcing minors to carry unwanted pregnancies to term, it is imperative that
our judicial system effectively adjudicate their rights.

call to a judge in order to make a consent determination would be sufficient outside a purely emergency
context.
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